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Chicago's Linked Development Fund: The Legality of
Imposing an Exaction Fee on Large-Scale Downtown
Office Developments
The city of Chicago, like other major cities, is trying to balance its
growth of office developments with its need for more low and moderate
income housing.1 Because new large-scale downtown office develop-
ments may create new jobs and bring new households into a city, Chi-
cago believes that its new downtown developments strain the already
minimal supply of affordable housing.2 In response to this concern, Chi-
cago seeks to impose an exaction fee3 on new large-scale downtown of-
fice developments and use the proceeds to create low and moderate
income housing.
This note examines the legality of Chicago's attempt to impose the
exaction fee. Part I discusses the factual assumptions that Chicago as-
serts to justify the imposition of the exaction fee. Part II addresses the
strength of these justifications in light of Chicago's statutory authority to
regulate land use. Part III analyzes Chicago's potential attempt to char-
acterize the exaction fee as a tax and impose the fee under its home rule
taxing power. Part IV concludes that, while Chicago lacks the statutory
authority to impose the exaction fee, the city's home rule taxing power
permits the city to impose the fee.
I. Chicago's Justification for Imposing an Exaction Fee
Chicago is faced with a neighborhood housing shortage. In 1980
Chicago had a housing vacancy rate of 6.9 percent. By 1983, however,
Chicago's housing vacancy rate was 3.6 percent. 4 The prime cause of
this shortage is that the new housing starts cannot keep pace with the
housing lost through demolition and abandonment. 5 A contributing
cause of this shortage, Chicago argues, is large-scale downtown office de-
velopments. Arguably, the creation of new large-scale downtown office
developments generates service sector employment growth.6 While Chi-
cago's housing stock is decreasing, Chicago's service sector employment
I See, e.g., INCLUSIONARY ZONING MovEs DOWNTOWN, (D. Merriam, D. Brower & P. Tegeler eds.
1985); Diamond, The San Francisco Office Housing Program: Social Policy Underwritten By Private Enterprise,
7 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 449 (1983); McCarron, Loop Rides Fast Track In Growth, Chi. Tribune, Oct. 21,
1986, at 1, col. 3.
2 See infra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
3 An exaction fee is a charge imposed to regulate an activity under a municipality's police power
or to raise revenue under a municipality's taxing power. See Lamere v. City of Chicago, 391 Ill. 2d
552, 563, 63 N.E.2d 863, 868 (1945).
4 The Advisory Committee on Linked Development, Draft Report, 33 (1985) [hereinafter cited
as Draft Report]. Copy on file with the NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW.
5 Id. ("While new housing starts average 5,034 units per year, the city has been losing an esti-
mated 6,127 units per year through demolition, abandonment, and other causes.").
6 Id. at 21.
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rate is increasing. 7 This growth will create the need in Chicago for an
estimated 2,800 to 5,600 new households per year over the next twelve
years.8
By generating service sector employment growth and relying on
Chicago's neighborhoods for sixty-one percent of their workers, 9 large-
scale downtown office developments place additional pressure on Chi-
cago's already minimal supply of neighborhood housing.10 Thus, the
city of Chicago argues that it is justified in imposing an exaction fee on
new downtown office developments because these developments contrib-
ute to Chicago's housing shortage.'1
To alleviate the housing shortage, Chicago seeks to create a "Linked
Development Fund" to help rebuild Chicago's neighborhoods. A spe-
cific source for this fund is the exaction fee.' 2 Chicago would impose the
exaction fee on all new downtown office developments that are over
50,000 square feet. The program mandates that the developers pay two
dollars per square foot when the city issues the building permit and for
the next four years on the annually occupied space.' 3 The fee is ex-
pected to generate forty million dollars over the next five years 14 and the
city will limit the use of the proceeds to the creation of low and moderate
income housing in Chicago's neighborhoods. 15
7 Id. at 33. The service sector employment rate has been increasing at an average of 2% per
year for the last fourteen years.
8 Id. at 34.
9 Id. at 7 (citing ILLINOIs BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, WHERE WORKERS WORK (1983)).
10 Id. at 21, 33. Chicago fails, however, to consider that service sector employment may be
increasing, not because of development, but because of Chicago's shift from a manufacturing society
to a service society. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
11 The Draft Report prepared by the Advisory Committee on Linked Development concludes
that:
[S]ervice sector jobs may have contributed to housing demand and therefore it is possible
to make an argument for a housing exaction from office buildings. The paper does not
attempt to make the type of detailed study that would be necessary to defend an exaction in
the courts; consequently, it does not make a judgment of whether the evidence would be
strong enough to stand up to a legal challenge in Illinois courts.
Id. at 34. Even if a detailed study could support everything that the Draft Report asserts, it is still
unlikely that a court would uphold the exaction under Illinois law. See infra notes 46-51 and accom-
panying text.
12 The exaction fee is expected to generate $4.8 million annually. Chicago has established four
other sources for the fund: (1) a real estate transfer tax on land trusts which is expected to generate
$4 million annually; (2) a use tax on office and commercial space which is expected to generate
$16.98 million annually; (3) changes in the State tax codes for insurance companies which are ex-
pected to generate from $500,000 to $1 million annually; and (4) zoning incentives which are ex-
pected to generate an indeterminable amount. Draft Report, supra note 4, at 16. The city will
appropriate money from this fund to create low and moderate income housing in Chicago's neigh-
borhoods and to improve and expand the city's economic base by funding projects that provide
employment opportunities for low and moderate income residents. Id. at 9, 10.
13 Id. at 21.
14 Id. This projection, however, assumes a conservative thirty-six month lease-out period for the
buildings to become occupied. Thus, construction in 1986 would yield $4.8 million at the time of
the building permit, and then yield $1.6 million in 1988 on the annually occupied space, $3.2 million
in 1989, and $4.8 million in 1990.
15 The Draft Report acknowledges that if the exaction fee is to withstand legal scrutiny, the city
must only use the proceeds from the exaction fee to alleviate the housing shortage. Id.
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NOTES
II. Statutory Power To Regulate Land Use
A. Statutory Power in General
Actions challenging the legality of an exaction fee usually involve
challenges to subdivision exactions. Generally, state legislatures grant
their municipalities the power to require a developer to dedicate land, or
money in lieu of land, to meet the needs created by the influx of people
into the new development when such needs would not exist but for the
development. 16 States differ, however, on the standards that justify
mandatory dedication. Some states only require a "reasonable relation"
between the need created and the exaction demanded.' 7 This test af-
fords great deference to the local legislature and puts a heavy burden on
the developer to show the absence of a reasonable relation.', On the
other hand, other states require that the need created be "specifically
and uniquely attributable" to the developer's activity.' 9 This test does
not grant deference to the local legislature and places a heavy burden on
the legislature.
20
B. Statutory Power in Illinois
Illinois municipalities have statutory authority to impose subdivision
exactions.2 ' The statute authorizes municipalities to establish planning
commissions and grants the planning commissions the power to exact
16 See Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863, 867 (Fla. App. 1976) ("It is
eminently reasonable, therefore, to allow the municipality to impose certain conditions upon the
developer so that it may provide for the needs of persons who would not otherwise have been a local
concern."). See also Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 447 (1966);
Pioneer Trust v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Il. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
17 See, e.g., Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949); Krieger v.
Planning Comm'n, 224 Md. 320, 167 A.2d 885 (1961); Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 106 N.E.2d
503 (1952).
18 Wald, 338 So. 2d at 866 ("The Ayres standard of'reasonable relation' puts a heavy burden on
the developer to show that the required dedication bears no relation to the general health, safety and
welfare."). See also Collis v. City of Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 246 N.W.2d 19 (1976).
19 Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill. 2d 448, 453, 167 N.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1960) ("the
developer of a subdivision may be required to assume those costs which are specifically and uniquely
attributable to his activity and which would otherwise be cast upon the public."). See also Aunt Hack
Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 27 Conn. Supp. 74, 230 A.2d 45 (1967); Pioneer Trust, 176
N.E.2d 799 (1961).
20 Wald, 338 So. 2d at 866 ("Pioneer Trust, on the other hand, shifts the burden of proving the
validity of the subdivision exactions to the municipality; mandatory dedication is only to be upheld
where the discerned needs are directly and solely attributable to the proposed subdivision."). This
heavy burden has forced many states to reject Illinois' strict requirement. As theJordan court stated:
We deem [the Pioneer Trust test] to be an acceptable statement of the yardstick to be
applied, provided the words "specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity" are not
so restrictively applied as to cast an unreasonable burden of proof upon the municipality
which has enacted the ordinance under attack. In most instances it would be impossible for
the municipality to prove that the land required to be dedicated for a park or a school site
was to meet a need solely attributable to the anticipated influx of people into the commu-
nity to occupy this particular subdivision. On the other hand, the municipality might well
be able to establish that a group of subdivisions [create a need specifically and uniquely
attributable to them].
28 Wis. 2d at 609, 137 N.W.2d at 447. See also Collis, 310 Minn. at 12, 246 N.W.2d at 23. These
cases, while illustrating the heavy burden faced by municipalities, also illustrate the implicit require-
ment that Illinois exactions must satisfy a need specifically and uniquely attributable to a particular
developer. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
21 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, paras. 11-12-4 to 12.
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reasonable requirements for certain defined public improvements. 22
Case law interpreting this statute has held that municipalities may re-
quire a developer to dedicate land, or money in lieu of land,23 to meet
the needs "specifically and uniquely attributable" to the developer's ac-
tivity.24 Even though case law surrounding this statute has developed
out of land use regulation through subdivision plat approval, the princi-
ples generated by this case law should apply, with all their substantive
force, to the analogous situation of land use regulation through the issu-
ance of building permits.
25
The first case to interpret the statute was Rosen v. Village of Downers
Grove.26 In Rosen, the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated a village ordi-
nance that required subdividers to dedicate land, or money in lieu of
land, for "educational purposes." 27 Although mandatory dedication was
not an issue in Rosen, the court cited a California case in which
mandatory dedication was an issue, stating that "[t]he provisions of the
statute.., appear to be based upon the theory that the developer of a
subdivision may be required to assume those costs which are specifically
and uniquely attributable to his activity and which would otherwise be cast upon the
public ... ,"28
22 The statute enables municipalities to grant planning commissions the power to adopt a plan
that:
[M]ay be implemented by ordinances (a) establishing reasonable standards of design for
subdivisions and for resubdivisions of unimproved land and of areas subject to redevelop-
ment in respect to public improvements as herein defined; (b) establishing reasonable re-
quirements governing the location, width, course, and surfacing of public streets and
highways, alleys, ways for public service facilities, curbs, gutters, sidewalks, street lights,
parks, playgrounds, school grounds, size of lots to be used for residential purposes, storm
water drainage, water supply and distribution, sanitary sewers, and sewage collection and
treatment.
Id. at para. 11-12-5. Arguably, since creating low and moderate income housing does not fall within
the list of statutorily defined public improvements, Chicago should lack the statutory authority to
impose the exaction fee for such a purpose. The city, however, may argue that its power to regulate
land use stems from its broad home rule police power and not the narrow statutory authority. See
infra note 53.
23 When the statute was first considered in Rosen, 19 Ill. 2d at 454, 167 N.E.2d at 234, the court
held that the statute did not authorize a municipality to exact money in lieu of land. However, in
Board ofEd. v. Surety Developers, 63 Ill. 2d 193, 202, 347 N.E.2d 149, 154 (1975), the court found,
without giving a detailed explanation, that municipalities have the statutory authority to exact money
in lieu of land.
24 See supra note 19.
25 See Surety Developers, 347 N.E.2d at 153 ("[t]he elevation of the Rosen test to a constitutional
basis in Pioneer [Trust] applies to land dedication requirements regardless of the legislation in-
volved."). See also Southern Pac. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 242 Cal. App. 2d 38, 51 Cal. Rptr. 197
(1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 647 (1967) (building permit); Diamond, supra note I at 471 ("the doc-
trine has also been applied to applications for other kinds of changes in land use, such as building
permits, zoning variances, and rezonings").
26 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960). See supra notes 19 & 23.
27 The court stated two reasons to support its holding. First, the term "educational purposes"
was broader than the statute's use of "school grounds." Second, the statute did not authorize the
municipality to exact money in lieu of land. 167 N.E.2d at 234. But see Surety Developers, supra note 23
(municipalities have the statutory authority to exact money in lieu of land).
28 19 Ill. 2d at 453, 167 N.E.2d at 233-34 (emphasis added). The court also stated that:
The distinction between permissible and forbidden requirements is suggested in Ayres v.
City Council of Los Angeles which indicates that the municipality may require the devel-
oper to provide the streets which are required by the activity within the subdivision but cannot
require hint to provide a major thoroughfare, the need for which steisfiom the entire community.
Id. at 234 (emphasis added; citation omitted).
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In Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect,29 the Illi-
nois Supreme Court faced the issue of mandatory dedication. In Pioneer
Trust, the court adopted Rosen's "specifically and uniquely attributable"
test, and the principles enunciated in Rosen, to invalidate a village ordi-
nance that required a subdivider to bear the sole financial burden of ded-
icating school and recreational land. The Pioneer Trust court determined
that, even though the subdivider's activity would "aggravate the existing
need" for additional school and recreational facilities, the need for the
additional facilities was the "result of the total development of the com-
munity" and therefore the need was not "specifically and uniquely attrib-
utable" to the developer's activity.3 0 Accordingly, the court stated that
the village could not place on the developer, as his "sole financial bur-
den," the cost of meeting the need for more school and recreational
facilities.
31
In Board of Education v. Surety Developers,32 the Illinois Supreme Court
explained the holding in Pioneer Trust, stating that Mount Prospect's
"dedication requirement was [invalid] simply [because it was] not limited
to the portion of the school needs specifically and uniquely attributable to
the developer's activity." 33 By interpreting Pioneer Trust in this manner,
the court established that it will uphold municipal exactions only if a dis-
cerned need is specifically and uniquely attributable to a developer's ac-
tivity and if the exaction is proportioned to the need created by the
developer. Indeed, the Surety Developers court upheld the challenged mu-
nicipal exaction because it found that the need for more school facilities
was specifically and uniquely attributable to the developer's activity and
that "the conditions imposed were clearly reasonable in light of defend-
ant's contribution to the creation of the school problem."3 4
29 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
30 Id. at 381, 176 N.E.2d at 802. However, the Rosen court's interpretation of Ayres, and Pioneer
Trust's subsequent reliance on Rosen's interpretation of Ayres, is incorrect. See Wald Corp, 338 So. 2d
at 866, where the court stated:
But while Ayres ruled that mandatory dedication requirements would be upheld where "rea-
sonably related" to municipal needs, Pioneer Trust ruled that such requirements would be
invalid unless "specifically and uniquely attributable" to the subdivider's activity.
Although the Pioneer Trust decision cited Ayres as precedent, it would seem that the two
cases proposed entirely different standards for the review of subdivision dedication
requirements.
Regardless of Pioneer Trust's correct or incorrect interpretation of Ayres, the fact remains that Illinois
case law is based upon that foundational interpretation. Whereas California case law developed a
requirement of "reasonableness," Illinois case law developed a stricter requirement of "specific and
unique attributability."
31 22 11. 2d at 381, 176 N.E.2d at 802.
32 63 11. 2d 193, 347 N.E.2d 149 (1975).
33 Id. at 203, 347 N.E.2d at 154 (emphasis added).
34 Id. at 204, 347 N.E.2d at 154 (emphasis added). See also Krughoffv. City of Naperville, 68 Ill.
2d 352, 358-59, 369 N.E.2d 892, 895 (1977) ("Here the evidence shows and the circuit court found
that the required contributions of land, or money in lieu of land, were uniquely attributable to and
fairly proportioned to the need for new school and park facilities created by the proposed
developments.").
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C. Analysis of Illinois Law
1. The Specifically and Uniquely Attributable Requirement
Illinois law will only allow a municipality to burden a developer to
the extent that the exaction sought is fairly proportioned to the need
deemed specifically and uniquely attributable to the developer's activ-
ity.3 5 Thus, two interrelated principles are applicable to any ordinance
requiring mandatory dedication: (1) specific and unique attributability to
a particular developer, and (2) proportionality. 36 The crucial link among
these principles is the specifically and uniquely attributable require-
ment-unless a need is deemed to be specificially and uniquely attributa-
ble to a particular developer's activity, the question of proportionality is
not reached.
The issue arises concerning the type of connection a court will re-
quire before it finds that a need is specifically and uniquely attributable
to a developer's activity. The court in Pioneer Trust held that the record
did not "establish that the need for [school and recreational facilities] is
one that is specifically and uniquely attributable to the addition of the
subdivision .... ,"37 The court made two findings to support its conclu-
sion. First, the court found that Mount Prospect had an existing need for
additional school and recreational facilities stemming from the "total de-
velopment of the community." 38 Second, the court found that the devel-
oper's addition of 250 residential units would only "aggravate the
existing need for additional school and recreational facilities."
39
In Surety Developers, the court held that the record established that the
need for school facilities was specifically and uniquely attributable to the
developer's activities. The court made two findings to support its con-
35 Moreover, implicit in Illinois case law is the requirement that the exaction will be upheld only
if the need is specifically and uniquely attributable to a particular developer, and not to a group of
developers. The language and reasoning of Pioneer Trust has led other state courts to conclude that if
a municipal exaction is to survive Illinois' specifically and uniquely attributable test, the municipality
must show that the need is directly and solely attributable to a particular developer's activity. See
supra note 20; Krughoffv. City of Naperville, 41111. App. 3d 334, 342, 354 N.E.2d 489, 497, af 'd., 68
Ill. 2d 352 (1976) (appellate decision) (the Pioneer Trust court held "that the record did not establish
that the need for recreational and educational facilities was specifically and uniquely attributable to
the addition of the particular subdivision ...."); and the supreme court decision in Krughoff, 68 Ill.
2d at 356, 369 N.E.2d at 894 (dedication requirements were individually applied and based on pro-
jections of how many people would live in each particular subdivision).
36 See Plote, Inc. v. Minnesota Alden Co., 96 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1006, 422 N.E.2d 231, 235
(1981), where the court stated that "[tihe test developed by the supreme court to distinguish be-
tween impermissible and permissible conditions is twofold: the contribution exacted must be 'spe-
cifically and uniquely attributable' to the developer's activity [citation], and must be proportioned to
the needs created by the development."
37 22 Ill. 2d at 381, 176 N.E.2d at 802.
38 Id.
39 The court stated that:
The agreed statement of facts shows that the present school facilities of Mount Prospect are
near capacity. This is the result of the total development of the community. If this whole
community had not developed to such an extent or if the existing school facilities were
greater, the purported need supposedly would not be present. Therefore, on the record in
this case the school problem which allegedly exists here is one which the subdivider should
not be obliged to pay the total cost of remedying, and to so construe the statute would
amount to an exercise of the power of eminent domain without compensation.
Id. at 381, 176 N.E.2d at 802.
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clusion. First, the court distinguished Pioneer Trust by finding that the
developer's subdivision "dramatically changed the character of the sur-
rounding area" because the subdivision was not an addition "to an ex-
isting municipality [as in Pioneer Trust] but the commencement of a new
one."'40 Second, the court found that "nearly 98%o of the students at-
tending the schools subsequently built in defendant's development lived
inside the development.
'" 4 1
Pioneer Trust and Surety Developers, unfortunately, are the only two Illi-
nois cases that justify their holding with a factual basis.42 The rest of the
cases that have dealt with the specifically and uniquely attributable test
justify their holdings with the plain language of the test. As such, the
test, as a legal standard, does not derive its substantive impact from judi-
cial interpretations, but rather from its own plain language. The test,
simply stated, demands a causal relationship-a municipality has to point
to a particular development and show that the development is the spe-
cific cause of the newly discerned need.
43
2. Analysis of Chicago's Specifically and Uniquely Attributable
Argument
Chicago seeks to establish the causal link with several arguments.
First, large-scale downtown office developments generate service sector
employment growth. Second, the service sector employment growth
translates into an estimated 9,200 new jobs annually over the next twelve
years. Third, considering that downtown office developments rely on
Chicago's neighborhoods for 61 percent of their workers, it is estimated
that the employment growth will create between 2,800 and 5,600 new
households annually for the next twelve years. Fourth, the increased
household growth, caused by the increased service sector employment
growth, which in turn is caused by large downtown developments, strains
Chicago's already minimal supply of affordable housing. Thus, the city
contends that the need for additional housing is specifically and uniquely
attributable to large-scale downtown office developments.
Even assuming that a court would accept Chicago's arguments that
the need for more housing is specifically and uniquely attributable to
groups of office developments, as opposed to particular developments,
44
Chicago fails to establish the specific and unique causal relationship.
45
This is true for three reasons. First, the increase in service sector em-
40 Surety Developers, 63 Ill. 2d at 203, 347 N.E.2d at 154.
41 Id.
42 The following nine Illinois cases have considered the specifically and uniquely attributable
test: Krughoff, 68 Il. 2d 352, 369 N.E.2d 892 (1977); Surety Developers, 63 Ill. 2d 193, 347 N.E.2d 149
(1975); People v. City of Lake Forest, 40 Ill. 2d 281, 239 N.E.2d 819 (1968); Pioneer Trust, 22 Ill. 2d
375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961); Rosen, 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960); Plote v. Minnesota Alden
Co., 96 Il. App. 3d 1001, 422 N.E.2d 231 (1981); Board of Ed. v. Green Valley Builders, Inc., 40 Ill.
App. 3d 812, 352 N.E.2d 306 (1976); Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Exchange Nat'l
Bank, 31 111. App. 3d 88, 334 N.E.2d 810 (1975); Brown v. City ofJoliet, 108 Ill. App. 2d 230, 247
N.E.2d 47 (1969).
43 See Wald Corp, 338 So. 2d at 867 (the court recognized "the cause and effect approach advo-
cated by Pioneer Trust .... ).
44 See supra notes 20 & 35 and accompanying text.
45 See supra note 11.
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ployment growth is more than offset by the decrease in manufacturing
jobs. Between 1973 and 1983, Chicago lost an average of 21,600 manu-
facturing jobs per year while the service sector had a growth rate of only
5,000 jobs per year.46 Thus, during this time frame, Chicago exper-
ienced a net loss ofjobs despite the service sector employment growth.
47
Second, this net loss will continue in future years because the estimated
continued growth in the service sector employment rate is more than off-
set by Chicago's pool of unemployed workers. In 1984 there were
193,000 unemployed Chicagoans, while it is estimated that from 1983
until 1995 the service sector will only create 9,200 new jobs per year.48
Therefore, even in the future there will be a net loss of jobs despite the
service sector employment growth. Third, considering the above statis-
tics, it is erroneous for the city to conclude that service sector employ-
ment growth will create an estimated 2,800 and 5,600 "new households"
annually for the next twelve years. As a result of Chicago's change from
a manufacturing based economy to a service based economy, the vast
majority of the estimated new households are actually "old manufactur-
ing households" transformed into "new service households."' 49 Thus,
the need for additional housing is not specifically and uniquely attributa-
ble to large-scale downtown office developments because these develop-
ments, while generating jobs, are not placing additional pressure on the
housing market. The service sector employment growth is offset by the
loss of manufacturing jobs and the pool of unemployed workers.
3. Proportionality
Even if Chicago could establish a specific and unique causal relation-
ship, a court could strike down the exaction on the ground that it is not
reasonably proportioned to the downtown developers' contribution to
the housing problem. Since it is estimated that the service sector em-
ployment growth will translate into 2,800 to 5,600 new households annu-
ally,50 the need for this many households is all that the large-scale
downtown office developers should be responsible for. Multiplied over
the next five years, 28,000 new households, assuming the highest esti-
mate, will be attributed to the service sector growth rate. In the same
period, however, Chicago seeks to exact $40 million from large-scale
downtown office developments. 5' The question remains then whether
$40 million is a disproportionate amount of money to create low and
moderate income housing for 28,000 households. If it is, a court should
46 Draft Report, supra note 4, at 7, 33. See also Mayor's Advisory Committee on Linked Develop-
ment, Minority Report on The Proposed Exaction Fee, 6 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Minority Re-
port]. Copy on file with the NOTE DAME LAW REVIEW.
47 Minority Report, supra note 46, at 6.
48 Draft Report, supra note 4, at 7, 33.
49 This is not to say, however, that the exact households have been transformed from manufac-
turing households to service households. Rather, as manufacturing households leave the Chicago
area to find work elsewhere, new service households take their place to maintain the status quo. See
Minority Report, supra note 46, at 3 and exhibit I (Chicago's population is expected to increase by
only 0.03% or 1,028 persons between 1980 and 2005).
50 See supra note 8.
51 See supra note 14.
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strike down Chicago's exaction fee as an invalid exercise of the city's po-
lice power.
52
III. Home Rule Powers
A. The Power to Tax and the Police Power
Assuming that the enabling statute does not authorize Chicago's at-
tempt to create a linked development fund, the issue arises whether Chi-
cago is authorized to establish such a fund under its home rule powers-
the power to tax or the police power.53 Because Chicago wants to use
exaction fees rather than land dedication, it is difficult to determine if the
city has to rely on the police power or the power to tax.
54
In Lamere v. City of Chicago,55 the Illinois Supreme Court distin-
guished the police power and the taxing power. The court stated that an
ordinance enacted under the police power is designed to regulate for the
public welfare while an ordinance enacted under the taxing power is not
designed to regulate but to raise revenue.5 6 The purpose of the exaction
fee is not to regulate the construction of new office buildings for the pub-
lic welfare. Rather, the purpose of the exaction fee is to raise revenue to
aid in the construction of low and moderate income housing.57 Thus, in
light of these basic principles, the exaction fee is a tax designed to raise
revenue and Chicago's authority to impose the exaction fee on large-
scale downtown office developments must stem from its power to tax.
5 8
52 As of this time there are no statistical studies examining the cost of creating 28,000 low and
moderate income housing units.
53 In Krughoff, 68 Ill. 2d at 360, 369 N.E.2d at 896, the court left open the possibility that a
municipality could derive its authority to regulate land use from its home rule police power rather
than from an enabling statute.
54 See Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Or. 99, 100, 359 P.2d 108, 110 (1961) ("The decision to seek
money with which to buy other land which might benefit another subdivision, or the public gener-
ally, took the county into the borderland area between the police power and the power to tax.").
55 391 Ill. 552, 63 N.E.2d 863 (1945).
56 Id. at 559, 63 N.E.2d at 866.
The purpose for which the police power may be exercised is for the protection of the lives,
health, morals, comfort and quiet of all persons ... [and an] ordinance enacted under such
power must be designed to prohibit or regulate those things which tend to injure the public
in such matters. On the other hand, an ordinance which provides for a license and the
payment of a license fee without regulatory provisions of any kind is solely a revenue mea-
sure and not within the police power.
See also Crocker v. Finley, 99 Ill. 2d 444, 459 N.E.2d 1346 (1984) (a charge referred to by statute as a
fee is in reality a tax where it has no relation to services rendered and is assessed to provide general
revenue); City of Chicago v. R.X. Restaurant, 369 Ill. 65, 15 N.E.2d 775 (1938); Herb Bros. v. City of
Alton, 264 Ill. 628, 106 N.E.2d 434 (1914).
57 The exaction fee is a tax since it is exacted solely for revenue purposes and its payment gives
the right to obtain a building permit. See Lamere, 391 Ill. at 564, 63 N.E.2d at 868 where the court
stated:
In noting the distinction between the exercises of the two powers, in 33 AmJur. p. 340,
it is said: "In general, therefore, where the fee is imposed for the purpose of regulation, and
the statute requires compliance with certain conditions in addition to the payment of the
prescribed sum, such sum is a license proper imposed by virtue of the police power, but
where it is exacted solely for revenue purposes and its payment gives the right to carry on
the business without any further conditions it is a tax."
58 Other jurisdictions have held that it is a tax if the purpose of the development fee is to raise
revenue and not to regulate. See, e.g., Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 27 Conn.
Supp. 74, 230 A.2d 45 (1967); Sanchez v. City of Santa Fe, 82 N.M. 322, 481 P.2d 401 (1971); State
Hous. Council v. City of Lake Oswego, 48 Or. App. 525, 617 P.2d 655 (1980); Weber Basis Home
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The 1970 Illinois Constitution grants Chicago, as a home rule mu-
nicipality, broad power to regulate its own affairs. 59 In Ampersand, Inc. v.
Finley,60 the Illinois Supreme Court noted that the powers were pur-
posely left without definition so that they would be broad.61 Moreover,
the Illinois Constitution also provides that the "[p]owers and functions
of home rule units shall be construed liberally."
62
B. Equal Protection and Due Process Challenges
The state's broad home rule powers, however, are not without limi-
tations. 63 The developers of large-scale downtown office developments
could challenge the exaction as violative of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Illinois and United States Constitution. These
attacks would probably be unsuccessful.
1. Equal Protection
In Fiorito v. Jones64 the Illinois Supreme Court provided basic equal
protection principles concerning taxes. The court noted that the legisla-
ture has broad power in defining tax classifications as long as the classifi-
cations are reasonable and as long as the classifications bear "some
reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation. ' 65 Moreover, in
Williams v. City of Chicago,66 the Illinois Supreme Court further elaborated
on the broad legislative power by noting that legislative classifications are
presumed valid and that the burden is on the one attacking the classifica-
Builders Ass'n. v. Ray City, 26 Utah 2d 215, 487 P.2d 866 (1971); Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snomish
County, 97 Wash. 2d 804, 650 P.2d 193 (1982).
59 ILL. CONST., art. VII, § 6(a) provides in relevant part:
Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any
function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to
regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax;
and to incur debt.
60 61 111. 2d 537, 338 N.E.2d 15 (1975).
61 Id. at 539, 338 N.E.2d at 17. See City of Evanston v. Crete, 85 Ill. 2d 101, 421 N.E.2d 196
(1981); City of Urbana v. Houser, 67 Ill. 2d 268, 367 N.E.2d 692 (1977).
62 ILL. CONST., art. VII, § 6(m). See Chicago Park Dist. v. City of Chicago, 111 111. 2d 7, 448
N.E.2d 968 (1986).
63 The most general limitation placed upon a municipality's home rule power is found in the
language of the very section that grants the power. Section 6(a) of article VII gives municipalities
home rule power only over those functions "pertaining to its government and affairs." ILL. CONST.,
art. VII, § 6(a). This provision should not prevent Chicago from imposing an exaction fee to help
fund the construction of low and moderate income housing. Such a fund is in "accordance with the
goals attempted to be achieved by the creation of home rule" in that Chicago can address the
"unique needs of its residents" through the development of such a fund. City of Evanston, 85 Ill. 2d
at 113, 421 N.E.2d at 201. See City of Urbana v. Paley, 68 Ill. 2d 62, 368 N.E.2d 915 (1977) (city has
home rule power to undertake a redevelopment program).
64 39 Ill. 2d 531, 236 N.E.2d 698 (1968).
65 Id. at 535, 236 N.E.2d at 702.
It is well established that the legislature has broad powers to establish reasonable clas-
sifications in defining subjects of taxation. It is equally well settled that the legislature may
define a general class which is subject to an occupation tax and then specifically remove a
subclass, or it may merely define a subclass without naming the general class. But regardless of the
manner in which the classes to be taxed have been defined, the classifications must be based upon
real and substantial differences between persons taxed and those not taxed, and they must bear some reason-
able relationship to the object of the legislation.
Id. at 535-36, 236 N.E.2d at 701-02 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
66 66 Il1. 2d 423, 362 N.E.2d 1030, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924 (1977).
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tion "to negate every conceivable basis which might support it."67 Thus,
equal protection analysis provides that legislative classifications, which
are presumed valid, will be upheld if any conceivable basis exists to sup-
port the classification and if some rational relationship exists between the
classification and the object of the legislation; equal protection requires
only that the classification not be arbitrary or unreasonable.
Chicago's exaction fee should survive an equal protection challenge.
First, the classification is not arbitrary because a conceivable basis sup-
ports it. That is, the legislature could have found that large-scale down-
town office developments, as opposed to downtown residential or
neighborhood residential developments, strain Chicago's housing sup-
ply. Moreover, the burden is on the developers of the large-scale office
developments to negate every conceivable basis which might support the
classification.6
8
Second, the classification is not unreasonable because "some" ra-
tional relationship exists between the classification (large-scale down-
town office developments) and the object of the legislation (the creation
of low and moderate income housing). The causal relationship needed,
as opposed to the specific and unique causal relationship needed under
the land regulation statute, can probably be satisfied by simply showing
that large-scale downtown office developments will additionally strain,
however slight, Chicago's housing supply. Thus, with the strong pre-
sumption supporting the legislative classification, the exaction fee should
satisfy equal protection analysis. 69
67 Id. at 432-33, 362 N.E.2d at 1035.
[I]t is equally well settled that there is a presumption favoring the validity of classifications
made by legislative bodies in taxing matters and that one who attacks them has the burden
of proving such classifications to be arbitrary and unreasonable. "The reasons justifying
the classification, moreover, need not appear on the face of the statute, and the classifica-
tion must be upheld if any set of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it.
The burden therefore rests on one who assails the statute to negate the existence of such
facts." ... "There is a presumption of constitutionality which can be overcome 'only by the
most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination
against particular persons and classes.' 'The burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrange-
ment to negate every conceivable basis which might support it.' "
Id. (emphasis added; citations omitted). See also, Illinois Gasoline Dealers Assoc. v. Chicago, 141111.
App. 3d 976, 981, 491 N.E.2d 112, 116 (1986) ("The reasons justifying the classification need not
appear on the face of the statute, and the classification will be upheld if any reasonable basis for the
classification can be found.").
68 For example, the developers would have to show that their employment pool either resides in
the suburbs or in Chicago neighborhoods with a housing surplus. See Krughoff, 68 Ill. 2d at 360, 369
N.E.2d at 896, where the court sustained a dedication requirement for school grounds that applied
to residential developments but not to commercial or industrial developments. The court held that
the residential developers were not denied equal protection because a rational distinction existed
between residential and commercial development. While the Krughoffcourt never expanded upon its
holding, the court likely reasoned that residential development strained the existing school system,
whereas commercial and industrial development did not place such a strain on the school system.
69 If the developers fail on an equal protection challenge, they could argue that the exaction fee
violates the Illinois constitutional requirement of uniformity in taxation. Section 2 of article IX of
the 1970 Constitution provides: "In any law classifying the subjects or objects of nonproperty taxes
or fees, the classes shall be reasonable and the subjects and objects within each class shall be taxed
uniformly." A court, however, should not uphold such a challenge. Section 2 of article IX is not
violated as long as the classification of new downtown office developers is reasonable and all devel-
opers are treated equally. Chicago will attain uniformity in taxation because all downtown office
developers, i.e., the subjects within the class, are charged the same initial fee and all developers are
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2. Due Process
The developers could next challenge the validity of the exaction fee
under the due process clause. Boynton v. Kusper70 is the most recent Illi-
nois Supreme Court case to consider a due process challenge to a tax
statute. In Boynton, the court considered the validity of a statute that im-
posed a tax on those seeking marriage licenses and required the city to
use the proceeds to fund a domestic violence shelter. The court found
that, while much effort had been expended to show a statistical relation-
ship between marriage and domestic violence, 71 the city did not have a
rational basis for imposing the tax on the narrow class of taxpayers.7 2
Thus, the court held that "the relationship between the purchase of a
marriage license and domestic violence [was] too remote to satisfy the
rational relation test of due process." 73
In reaching its decision the Boynton court relied upon Crocker v. Fin-
ley. 7 4 In Crocker, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the validity of a
statute that imposed a tax on those seeking divorce and required the city
to use the proceeds to fund a domestic violence shelter. The Crocker
court invalidated the statute because it violated both the Illinois due pro-
cess clause and the right to obtain justice freely. First, the Crocker court
found that there was a disparity in the taxing scheme because those bur-
dened with the tax were not the only ones benefited by the tax.75 Be-
cause no "rational basis for imposing the tax" on the limited class of
taxpayers existed, the court held that this disparity was an arbitrary exer-
cise of legislative power which is "violative of due process, as well as
equal protection, guaranteed by [the Illinois] Constitution."-76 Second,
the court found that the relationship between the domestic violence shel-
ter and the court system was "too remote. '77 The court found that the
tax was not related to the operation and maintenance of courts. Thus,
the Crocker court held that the statute was invalid because the tax inter-
fered with the constitutional right to obtain justice freely. 78
Although the Crocker court had two separate grounds for invalidating
the tax statute, the Boynton court combined the two grounds into its due
process analysis. According to the Boynton court, the Crocker court found
no rational basis for imposing the tax on the narrow class of taxpayers
because the relationship asserted between those filing for divorce and
those using the domestic violence shelter was too remote.79 Thus, the
charged subsequent annual fees based upon their annually occupied space. See Illinois Gasoline Dealers
Assoc., 491 N.E.2d at 116 (Section 2 of article IX of the 1970 Constitution is satisfied because the
ordinance taxes all purchasers of gasoline uniformly and the classification is reasonable.).
70 112 Il1. 2d 356, 494 N.E.2d 135 (1986).
71 Id. at 366, 494 N.E.2d at 138-39.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 99 Ill. 2d 444, 459 N.E.2d 1346 (1984).
75 Id. at 456, 459 N.E.2d at 1352.
76 Id. at 457, 459 N.E.2d at 1352.
77 Id. at 455, 459 N.E.2d at 1351.
78 Id.
79 112 Ill. 2d at 366, 494 N.E.2d at 139. The court stated:
In Crocker those seeking to uphold the tax likewise contended that there was a reasonable
relation between the taxed class and the legislative purpose .... However, this court [in
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Boynton court, through its manipulation of the Crocker holding, focused its
due process analysis on the relationship between the class taxed and the
object of the legislation.
This focus was evident when the Boynton court relied on Grasse v.
Dealer's Transport Co. 8 0 for the test to determine the "reasonableness of a
classification from a due process point of view." ' According to the Boyn-
ton court, the due process rational relation test requires that the legisla-
ture show that the classification bears a rational relationship to the object
of the legislation.8
2
This relationship, however, is the proper focus of equal protection
analysis.8 3 Moreover, under an equal protection analysis the classifica-
tion carries a presumption of validity and a court will only invalidate the
classification if it lacks any conceivable supporting basis.8 4 Due process
analysis should focus on the leglislation in question and its relationship
to the object of the legislation. Indeed, the Boynton court, after it relied
on Grasse for the due process rational relation test, accurately stated the
due process standard.8 5 Nothwithstanding the Boynton court's recogni-
tion of the correct due process standard, it failed to properly apply the
Crocker] held that there was no rational basis for imposing the tax on only the narrow class
of taxpayers selected under the Act .... The court stated that the relationship asserted is
simply too remote. The same reasoning is applicable to the class selected for taxation in
this case, and the trial court properly held that the decision in Crocker was controlling.
As in Crocker, we consider the relationship between the purchase of the marriage license
and domestic violence to be too remote to satisfy the rational relation test of due process.
Id. (citations omitted). The Boynton court, however, erred in its reasoning because the Crocker court
never considered the relationship between the class taxed and the domestic violence shelter. Rather,
the court considered the relationship between the domestic violence shelter and the operation of the
court system, finding this relationship too remote. See Crocker, 99 Ill. 2d at 455, 459 N.E.2d at 1351.
80 412 Ill. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952).
81 112 111. 2d at 366,494 N.E.2d at 139. The Boynton court relied upon Grasse for the due process
viewpoint of testing classifications. The Grasse court, however, was not concerned with such a view-
point. Rather, the court was concerned with equal protection and only mentioned due process to
clarify the distinction between the two clauses. Indeed, the Grasse court, 412 Ill. at 194, 106 N.E.2d
at 132, continues: "Although these constitutional guarantees overlap, so that a violation of one may
involve the violation of the other, the spheres of protection they offer are not coterminous, for the
guarantee of equal protection of the laws extends beyond the requirements of due process."
Both Crocker and Boynton noted this "overlapping." Because equal protection guarantees extend
beyond due process guarantees, these courts should have considered that if equal protection is satis-
fied, due process will not be violated for disparity in tax burdens and benefits. See infra notes 90, 92,
& 97 and accompanying text.
82 112 Il. 2d at 366-67, 494 N.E.2d at 139. The Boynton court stated further that:
the particular classification is based upon some real and substantial difference in kind, situa-
tion or circumstance in the persons or objects on which the classification rests, and which
bears a rational relation to the evil to be remedied and the purpose to be attained by the
statute, otherwise the classification will be deemed arbitrary and in violation of the constitu-
tional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.
Id. (emphasis in original).
83 See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
84 Id.
85 The Boynton court stated:
The due process clause of our constitution, insofar as it limits the exercise of the State's
police or taxing powers, prohibits the arbitrary and unreasonable use of these powers. To
be a valid exercise of the police power, the legislation must bear a reasonable relationship to
the public interest to be served and the means adopted must be a reasonable method to
accomplish such objective. If a law bears a reasonable relationship to a proper legislative pur-
pose and is not arbitrary or discriminatory, the requirements of due process are met.
112 I1. 2d at 367, 494 N.E.2d at 139-40 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
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standard. Rather, the court applied a mixed equal protection and due
process standard. Consequently the court invalidated the classification,
without affording it a presumption of validity, because the court found
that the classification was insufficiently related to the object of the
legislation.
The correct interpretation of Illinois due process law holds that if
the legislative enactment bears a "reasonable relationship to a proper legis-
lative purpose and is not arbitrary or discriminatory, the requirements of
due process are met."8 6 The downtown office developers, challenging
the exaction fee imposed by the city of Chicago as violative of due pro-
cess could make two arguments. First, the purposes of the ordinance,
raising revenue and creating low and moderate income housing, are not
proper legislative purposes. Second, the ordinance is arbitrary because
no rational basis exists for imposing the tax on the limited class of tax-
payers when the benefits of the tax are not limited to these taxpayers.
With regard to the purpose of the ordinance, it is not disputed that
"the proceeds of the tax must be used for 'corporate purposes' of the
municipality levying the tax." 87 The purpose of the exaction fee can
either be to establish low and moderate income housing or to raise reve-
nue, both of which are valid corporate purposes.88 Thus, regardless of
whether the purpose of the ordinance is characterized as a specific non-
fiscal objective or a general revenue objective, it is a valid corporate
purpose.
As to the disparity between those benefited and those burdened with
the tax, the United States Supreme Court, in Carmichael v. Southern Coal &
Coke Co. ,89 stated that:
It is not a valid objection to the present tax, conforming in other re-
spects to the Fourteenth Amendment [i.e. equal protection], and devoted
to a public purpose, that the benefits paid and the persons to whom they
are paid are unrelated to the persons taxed and the amount of the tax
which they pay-in short, that those who pay the tax may not have
contributed to the [housing shortage] and may not be benefited by the
expenditure.... Nothing is more familiar in taxation than the imposi-
tion of a tax upon a class or upon individuals who enjoy no direct benefit from
its expenditure, and who are not responsible for the condition to be remedied.9 °
In Library Directors v. Lake Forest,9 1 the Illinois Supreme Court reiter-
ated Carmichael's principles when it stated that a "lack of uniformity in the
86 Id. (emphasis in original). See Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Ass'n v. Block, 75 Ill. 2d 443, 454,
389 N.E.2d 529, 533 (1979); S. Bloom, Inc. v. Mahin, 61111. 2d 70, 77, 329 N.E.2d 213, 218 (1975).
87 Library Directors v. Lake Forest, 17 Ill. 2d 277, 283, 161 N.E.2d 272, 276 (1959).
88 See, e.g., City of Canton v. Crouch, 79 Ill. 2d 356, 403 N.E.2d 242 (1980) (elimination of urban
blight is a legitimate public purpose even though incidental private benefit will occur); Paley, supra
note 63 (City's desire to promote commercial rebirth of downtown area is a valid public purpose).
See also Rapid Transit Corp. v. New York, 303 U.S. 573 (1937) ("Regardless of the specific appropria-
tion to be made from the tax proceeds, the object of the tax statute was to raise revenue."); Mahin,
supra note 86 (raising revenue is a proper legislative purpose).
89 301 U.S. 495 (1937).
90 Id. at 521-22 (emphasis added). See also Springfield Hotel-Motel Ass'n. v. Springfield, 119 Ill.
App. 3d 753, 457 N.E.2d 1017 (1983) (proceeds from the City's tax on hotel rooms did not have to
be confined to tourism, but could be used for general corporate purposes).
91 17 Ill. 2d 277, 161 N.E.2d 272 (1959).
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imposition of a tax is fatal to the levy, but if the tax is imposed with equal-
ity and uniformity and collected for the public welfare, the rule [of uniform-
ity] does not apply to inequality of distribution." 92 Thus, if Chicago's
ordinance imposing an exaction fee on large-scale downtown office de-
velopments survives an equal protection challenge and a public purpose
challenge, the ordinance will not violate due process even if the down-
town office developers are not responsible for the housing shortage or
will receive no direct benefit from the creation of the low and moderate
income housing.
3. United States Supreme Court Case Law
In Rapid Transit Corp. v. New York, 93 the United States Supreme Court
faced a situation similar to the one facing Chicago. In Rapid Transit, the
Court considered the validity of a New York City "Local Law" which
taxed a specific class of utilities and which required the city to use the
proceeds of the tax solely for the purpose of easing the city's unemploy-
ment. The utilities alleged, as the downtown Chicago developers might
allege, that the law violated equal protection because the classification
was not reasonably related to the object of the legislation and that the
law violated due process because the law improperly burdened one class
of taxpayers for an evil that they were not solely responsible for. The
Court rejected both challenges and upheld the tax.
The Court held that the law did not violate equal protection. The
Court found that several reasons justified the legislature's classification
of the utilities94 and, notwithstanding the fact that the legislature specifi-
cally appropriated the proceeds of the tax, the Local Law's object was to
raise revenue. Thus, the Court concluded that the classification was rea-
sonably related to the object of the legislation.9 5
With regard to due process, the Court quoted Carmichael96 and held
that it was not constitutionally necessary for the classification to be re-
lated to the appropriation. This allowed the Court to conclude that
"[w]hat we have said in showing that the Local Laws do not deny the
equal protection of the laws also disposes of the [utility's] contention that
the Local Laws constitute a deprivation of due process.., and as laying
on a particular class a burden which should be born by all."' 97
Consistent with federal case law enunciated in Rapid Transit and Car-
michael, and Illinois case law enunciated in Library Directors, once a court
determines that a tax classification does not violate equal protection and
that the appropriation is for a public purpose, the court should hold that
the tax classification does not violate due process even though the bur-
dened class is not the cause of the evil or that the burdened class will not
92 Id. at 282, 161 N.E.2d at 276 (emphasis added).
93 303 U.S. 573 (1937).
94 Id. at 580-81 (administrative convenience and the utilities' freedom from direct private
competition).
95 Id. at 586-87.
96 See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
97 303 U.S. at 587.
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receive any direct benefit from the suppression of the evil. 98 Thus, Chi-
cago's classification should withstand both an equal protection challenge
and a due process challenge. Neither the United States nor the Illinois
Constitution requires the burdened class to receive the benefit of the tax.
IV. Conclusion
Chicago lacks the statutory authority to impose an exaction fee on
large-scale downtown office developments in order to create low and
moderate income housing in the city's neighborhoods. This is true for
two reasons. First, downtown office developments are not placing addi-
tional pressure on the housing market because the service sector employ-
ment growth is offset by the loss of manufacturing jobs and the pool of
unemployed workers. Thus, the need for additional housing is not spe-
cifically and uniquely attributable to large-scale downtown office devel-
opments. Second, even if the need for additional housing is specifically
and uniquely attributable to downtown office developments, the exaction
fee may be disproportionate to the need created by the developments.
Chicago, however, is authorized to impose such an exaction under
its home rule taxing power for two reasons. First, the exaction fee satis-
fies both federal and state equal protection clauses because a conceivable
basis supports the legislative classification and the classification is rea-
sonably related to the object of the legislation. Second, the exaction fee
satisfies due process because neither the federal or state constitutions
require a city to show that the burdened class is either the cause of the
evil or the recipient of the benefit from the suppression of the evil. Thus,
the large-scale downtown office developers must request the General As-
sembly to curb Chicago's broad home rule taxing power.9 9
Paul E. Meyer
98 In Crocker, 99 Ill. 2d at 457, 459 N.E.2d at 1352, the court found that it was an arbitrary
exercise of the legislature's police power, and thus violative of due process, to place "upon the
members of a class a burden not shared by others." The Crocker court, however, as with the Boynton
court, failed to utilize the permissive equal protection test before holding in this manner.
99 If the courts do not invalidate the tax, the developers can turn to the General Assembly to
curb possible abuses in a home rule unit's taxing power. Section 6(g) of article VII of the Illinois
Constitution provides that "[tihe General Assembly by a law approved by the vote of three-fifths of
the members elected to each house may deny or limit the power to tax and any other power or
function of a home rule unit .... See Chicago Park Dist. v. City of Chicago, 111 111. 2d 7, 17, 488
N.E.2d 968, 973 (1986) ("It is for the General Assembly, under article VII, section 6(g), to consider
possible abuses of home rule powers.").
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